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Kahneman, Daniel.  Thinking, Fast and Slow.  New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2011 reviewed by  
Professor Robin Mansell, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
In examining this challenging and innovative work, my concern is with 
understanding the processes informing or biasing decision making at the 
institutional level. Kahneman suggests that “the idea that our minds are 
susceptible to systematic errors is now generally accepted” (p. 10), but it is not 
clear what this means when we consider choices taken by institutional 
authorities such as regulators or policy makers. He suggests that “organizations 
are better than individuals when it comes to avoiding errors, because they 
naturally think more slowly and have the power to impose orderly procedures” 
(p. 418). Thus, his analysis is not only aimed at understanding the biases of 
individual decision makers, but also at how institutions express collective 
choices.  
 
Although the unitary decision maker model implied is questionable, Kahneman’s 
observations about System 1 and 2 thinking open opportunities for 
understanding bias at the institutional level. This is relevant beyond the 
disciplines of psychology and economics. In interdisciplinary fields such as 
science, technology and innovation studies, it is often assumed that investment 
in evermore sophisticated digital technologies for processing information means 
that our connectedness and improved access to information will lead to 
improved decision making.  
 
In many policy making forums, those who rest their arguments on intuition or 
less than what others deem to be ‘full’ information, are often said to be 
‘irrational’ or to be ignoring an evidence base that should underpin policy 
prescriptions.  Kahneman’s System 1/System 2 model is helpful insofar as he 
does not dichotomise rational and irrational decision making. He says that  
“humans are not irrational” (p. 411) and that any expectation of logical 
consistency in human preferences is “a hopeless mirage” (p. 335). Commenting 
that the way economists use the term ‘rationality’ assumes an impossible 
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standard of consistency across different situations, he also argues that the use of 
intuition and heuristics (System 1) to make decisions is much more common 
than effortful decision making. This is because time is “the ultimate finite 
resource” (p. 409). System 2 decision making requires that time is taken to 
process information and is filtered through often poorly understood cognitive 
processes.  Learned patterns may lead to perceived coherency especially when 
challenging information is disregarded. These issues matter in decision 
situations where “the stakes are high” (p. 192).  This arguably is the case in 
policy making or regulatory settings where stakeholder interests are affected by 
decisions taken by institutions with a remit to act in ways that affect individual 
lives or corporate interests.  
 
Kahneman suggests that institutions can try to counter System 1 biases by 
enabling individuals to be more alert to sources of bias. He says that they can be 
sensitized to the factors that give rise to bias when they understand cognitive 
processes and acquire a vocabulary to talk about them, e.g. the halo effect, 
competitor neglect, loss aversion, etc. Kahneman et al. (2011) offer a checklist 
for managers who take decisions that can be used to help keep biases in check.  
In their paper, it is  acknowledged that self interest may be associated with 
interests in financial gain, organizational power, or reputational gain, for 
instance.  He also suggests that we should be wary of decision making in many 
organisations when someone “controls what you see [and] has a vested interest 
in what you choose” (p. 361) .  Thus, the presence of vested interests is 
acknowledged at the individual and institutional levels of decision making and 
for all choice situtations. The biases of System 1 thinking are always present.  
 
The use of check lists and other tools does not provide a basis for optimism that 
this will necessarily improve judgements. Kahneman suggests only that it may be 
possible to become better at recognizing situations that are prone to errors in 
judgement and to then to use decision quality control procedures to ensure that 
deliberate efforts are made to invoke effortful System 2 thinking.  The trouble 
with this is that procedures that are intended to strengthen the quality of 
decision making can themselves be hi-jacked by those who are in a position to 
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exercise power over others. In addition, when procedural rules start to 
dominate, this can serve as a break on human creativity, risk taking, and the 
flexibility normally required for innovation.  Kahneman argues that individuals 
“will make better choices when they trust their critics to be sophisticated and 
fair” (p. 418), but he does not seem to address what the implications of quality 
control procedures are when they are introduced in institutional settings 
characterized by conflict, for example, by mistrust or asymmetrical power 
relations between managers and workers.  
 
Nevertheless, Kahneman’s work should serve as a wake-up call for policy makers 
and regulators who persist in resisting decision making in the absence of ‘full’ 
evidential information.  Even if they do accumulate vast amounts of evidence, 
System 1 biases are likely to be present at the evidence interpretation stage and 
this will affect decision outcomes regardless of how long the policy maker or 
regulator waits. Taking the findings of Thinking, Slow and Fast seriously suggests 
that there is good reason to challenge efforts to standardize the collection of 
information so as to arrive at the best solutions to problems that policy makers 
and regulators are charged with addressing.  Instead, it would be better to 
acknowledge that, whatever the state of the evidence base, it is more important 
to apply critical thinking, to invoke System 2 thinking in contexts where choices 
are very consequential for people’s lives and to acknowledge, that even then, 
interests will be present and that these are likely to bias the choices that are 
taken. 
 
In addition to promoting decision quality control procedures and the acquisition 
of a vocabulary for articulating the ways in which cognitive process are error 
prone, Kahneman seems to suggest that better decisions arise when we rely on 
automated information systems. He notes that “hostility to algorithms will 
probably soften as their role in everyday life continues to expand” (p. 229). 
Should we take this to mean that increasing numbers of decisions of 
consequence in our lives should be taken on our behalf by software agents 
operating behind the computer screen?  Perhaps we should, since as Kahneman 
says, “statistical algorithms greatly outdo humans in noisy environments” (p. 
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241).  With the spread of digital networks and the growing sophistication of 
information processing capabilities, algorithms are indeed acting more 
frequently on our behalf. Kahneman points to the fact that “formulas may do 
better than humans in some critical decisions in the world of sports” (p. 229).  
They help us with recommendations about music and books using Amazon and 
many other recommenders systems. However, the creep of formulas into 
decision making is not always a good thing insofar as the design and 
implementation of these systems are not immune to bias.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, he says “we take it for granted that decisions about credit limits are 
made without the direct intervention of any human judgment” (p. 229).  Indeed, 
many of us do take this for granted, but one consequence is that personal 
bankruptcy rates are soaring.  This is testimony to the negative impacts of over-
reliance on these unaccountable systems. 
 
It seems likely that Kahneman would acknowledge this, but he does not explicitly 
ask the crucial question: who will hold institutions that rely upon automation or 
the designers of the algorithms to account? This is an important consideration. 
For instance, financial markets have become very reliant on automated 
computer progress over the past several decades in their efforts to devise bias 
(intermediary) free mechanisms for trading exchanges. The result of these 
developments has introduced a number of perverse effects in the trading system 
including the weakening of norms that foster desirable trading behaviours 
(Beunz et al. 2011; and see Mansell 2012 on accountability and pervasive 
automation).   
 
Although, he does not appear to acknowledge this explicitly in this book, 
Kahneman’s argument serves as a cautionary tale when it comes to the 
cyberoptimism that yields the notion that sophisticated information systems 
algorithms will produce rational outcomes in the choices taken by policy making 
and regulatory institutions. His argument is that such algorithms may mitigate 
the negative effects of the role of emotion in decision making. If decisions are 
guided by the calculus of algorithms, however, there is no reason to think that 
biases of interests and power relations have been eliminated.  In some cases, the 
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evidence produced by algorithmic calculations may be linked to a more robust 
information base, but this does not mean that decisions will be bias free or well-
aligned with the interests of all parties.  
 
Kahneman insists that effortful decision making takes time. If  time is the 
ultimate scarce resource, then the time saving attributes of automated 
information systems may free up time for effortful System 2 thinking, but if the 
systems themselves are devised in ways that are not transparent and the 
designers are not accountable, then institutional decision making may become 
more likely to rest on heuristics than it is today. It is crucial that the lessons of 
Kahneman’s model of System 1 and System 2 thinking start to be critically 
reviewed and integrated in fields of study beyond disputes among those working 
within the disciplines of economics and psychology.   
 
Interdisciplinary fields such as science, technology and innovation studies also 
will benefit from a careful consideration of far-reaching implications of trends 
that are fostering the automation of decision making.  Account needs to be taken 
of features such as time-saving and less error-prone decisions with respect to 
probabilities. However, the equally important consequences of new areas of life 
which are becoming hidden from view and thus becoming unaccountable, also 
need to be examined.  These developments surely raise questions about 
democratic decision making and the norms of human behaviour that we want to 
inform decisions taken by our governing institutions.    
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